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ABSTRACT In this paper, we study radio frequency energy harvesting (EH) in a wireless sensor network
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (EAVs). Specifically, the sensor source and multiple sensor relays
harvest energy from multiple power transfer stations (PTSs), and then, the source uses this harvested energy
to transmit information to the base station (BS) with the help of the relays. During the transmission of
information, the BS typically faces a risk of losing information due to the EAVs. Thus, to enhance the secrecy
of the considered system, one of the relays acts as a jammer, using harvested energy to generate interference
with the EAVs. We propose a best-relay-and-best-jammer scheme for this purpose and compare this scheme
with other previous schemes. The exact closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
is obtained and is validated through Monte Carlo simulations. A near-optimal EH time algorithm is also
proposed. In addition, the effects on the SOP of key system parameters such as the EH efficiency coefficient,
the EH time, the distance between the relay and BS, the number of PTSs, the number of relays, and the
number of EAVs are investigated. The results indicate that the proposed scheme generally outperforms both
the best-relay-and-random-jammer scheme and the random-relay-and-best-jammer scheme in terms of the
secrecy capacity.
INDEX TERMS Energy harvesting, wireless sensor networks, relay networks, friendly jammer, physical
layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have come to
be considered key technologies for Internet of Things (IoTs)
applications in which sensor nodes (SNs) are responsible for
instantaneous or periodic data collection in various environ-
ments; such applications includemanufacturing and precision
agriculture [1]–[3]. However, the energy storage capacity of
SNs is limited, and thus, SNs need to be replaced periodi-
cally to maintain SN operations [4]. This need for frequent
replacement is very dangerous in hazardous environments
such as nuclear reactors. Accordingly, prolonging the product
life for SNs has become one of themost challenging problems
for WSNs.
Fortunately, recent advances in energy harvesting (EH)
techniques have enabled promising solutions that prolong the
product life and increase the energy efficiency of SNs [5]–[8].
By means of EH techniques, SNs can harvest energy from
ambient energy sources such as solar radiation, wind, and
radio signals, which, in turn, allows the SNs to operate
continuously [9]. However, the availability of these sources
is difficult to predict and impossible to control [7]. An alter-
native solution, namely, radio frequencys (RFs) EH, has
been proposed [10]. This approach is based on the fact that
radio signals provide a sustainable power supply in wireless
networks and can be harvested and converted into usable
energy for SNs. RF EH has been shown to enhance the
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system energy efficiency inWSNs [11], [12]. Because the SN
lifetime is prolonged through the proposed scheme, the secu-
rity of the underlying communication medium is also crit-
ical in WSNs [13]–[15]. The signals broadcast over wireless
channels must be protected against tampering and/or modi-
fication by adversaries. Without an efficient and effective
mechanism in place, WSNs may be easily compromised.
To mitigate this problem, a physical layer security (PLS)
technique has been proposed that has attracted consid-
erable attention from the research community [16]–[22].
This technique exploits the characteristics of wireless chan-
nels (e.g., fading, noise, and interference) and does not
require complex computations to enable secure communica-
tion in wireless networks [20]. Hyadi et al. [21] presented
a detailed overview of recent and ongoing research works
on PLS with uncertain channel state information (CSI).
Choi et al. [16] investigated PLS techniques for performing
distributed detection in the presence of an eavesdropper
(EAV) in the working environment. In [17], Zhu et al.
proposed an optimal sensor scheduling scheme to enhance
the PLS of industrial WSNs. Zheng et al. [22] proposed a
hybrid full-duplex/half-duplex receiver deployment strategy
to secure legitimate transmissions.
Taking advantage of a number of spatial and temporal
techniques, cooperative relay communications and friendly
jammers have been studied to achieve PLS improve-
ments [23]–[26]. In particular, in [23], the secrecy
performance under the influence of relays and jammers was
evaluated in terms of the secrecy outage probability (SOP).
In [24], Chen et al. considered a wireless model with two
sources, one EAV, and intermediate nodes. The authors
proposed algorithms for joint relay and jammer selection
in two-way relay networks with the aim of improving
the SOP.
In [25], Li et al. considered a cooperative wireless network
under two specific schemes: a decode-and-forward (DF) relay
scheme and cooperative jamming. The authors also proposed
solutions to enhance the performance of secure transmission
by maximizing the achievable secrecy rate and minimizing
the total power transmit power. Zheng et al. [26] optimized
the power allocation and transmission region under an SOP
constraint and then analyzed the effect of a DF relay scheme
on the secrecy performance. However, the combination of
EH, PLS, and cooperative communication has not been
commonly addressed in the literature.
Motivated by all of the works listed above and the refer-
ences therein, in this paper, we study the secrecy performance
of an RFEH-WSN and propose a best-relay-and-best-jammer
scheme to enhance the secrecy performance. Ourmain contri-
butions are summarized as follows:
• Wepropose a cooperative communication strategy for an
EH-WSN inwhich the best relay and the best jammer are
selected from among multiple relays. We compare this
approach with previous schemes, such as the best relay
with a random jammer and a random relay with the best
jammer [27].
• Based on the proposed scheme, we derive an exact
closed-form expression for the SOP. This formula
enables the rapid evaluation of the secrecy performance.
Moreover, we propose a near-optimal EH time algorithm
for the best-relay-and-best-jammer scheme (BBS).
• Our numerical results indicate that 1) the proposed
scheme outperforms both the best-relay-and-random-
jammer scheme (BRS) and the random-relay-and-best-
jammer scheme (RBS) and 2) the performance of the
proposed scheme significantly improves as the number
of relays and the number of power transfer stations
(PTSs) increase and as the number of EAVs decreases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section II, some related work on the secrecy performance
of relay-based WSNs is presented. In Section III, the system
model, signal model, and three communication schemes are
introduced. In Section IV, the SOPs corresponding to the
three considered schemes are analyzed. In Section V, numer-
ical results are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions
are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Cooperative relay communication is a popular approach
to improving PLS; thus, several works have investigated
relay systems in WSNs [28]–[34]. For example, in 2016,
Q. Xu et al. studied an IoT application with randomly
distributed EAVs with the help of such a relay scheme.
The authors investigated two scenarios: one in which each
device was equipped with a single antenna and another
in which the devices were equipped with multiple antennas
for relaying and EAVs. Then, the SOP and the optimal power
allocation in each of the two scenarios were derived [28].
X. Gong et al. investigated a system in which a source,
multiple relays, a destination, and an EAV were deployed.
Gong et al. [29] proposed a robust beamforming scheme to
recover a fraction of the performance lost.
As an extension of the work done in [28] and [29],
Q. Y. Liau et al. investigated a more complex model
including a source, a destination, two half-duplex relays,
and an EAV. Liau et al. [30] proposed two-path succes-
sive relaying (TPSR) to improve the security of the system.
Y. Deng et al. considered a three-tier WSN using a DF relay
scheme in which the considered system included multiple
SNs, access points, sinks, and external EAVs. Based on this
model, the authors proposed new expressions for the average
secrecy rate to analyze the transmission security in practical
WSNs [31]. However, the possibility of relay selection to
further boost secrecy performance has not been considered.
With regard to friendly cooperative jammers, Araujo et al.
[32] proposed a jamming strategy to address the problem of
secure communication in WSNs. M. Yang et al. investigated
the scenario of a WSN with one base station (BS), multiple
users, one EAV, and one cooperative jammer. Each user and
EAV was equipped with a single antenna, while the BS and
jammer hadmultiple antennas. Accordingly, transmit antenna
selection was performed for the BS and jamming signals to
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achieve a satisfactory secrecy performance. An exact closed-
form expression for the SOP was derived to evaluate the
secrecy performance [33].
To improve the secrecy performance of WSNs,
Zhang et al. [34] investigated a relay-based scheme with a
friendly jammer. The authors focused on two schemes, one
with cooperative jamming and one without, to evaluate the
security of a two-way relay WSN in the presence of an EAV.
The authors then proposed a near-optimal resource allocation
algorithm for the first scheme and a heuristic algorithm based
on alternating optimization for the second scheme to improve
the secrecy performance. Zheng et al. [35] investigated a two-
tier heterogeneous decentralized wireless network (DWN),
in which the SNs and receivers (data collection stations)
in each tier were organized in pairs. They studied the benefits
of FD receiver jamming to enhance the PLS of the consid-
ered system. Notably, the works discussed above considered
jamming only in WSNs without EH.
To explicitly identify and address the limitations of other
works, particularly on relaying with jamming in the EH case,
we investigate the PLS in an RF EH-WSN in which the
SN source delivers packets to the BS via multiple relays
while EAVs are jammed by a friendly jammer. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous publication has addressed this
problem.
III. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
In this section, the system model, EH process, and signal
model are presented.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a relay-based RF EH-WSN, as illustrated
in Fig. 1, in which a packet is transmitted by a source S
to a BS B with the help of multiple intermediate relays Ln,
n = 1, . . . ,N + 1, in the presence of multiple passive EAVs
Ek , k = 1, . . . ,K . Under the assumption that the SNs are
FIGURE 1. The system model of a relay-based RF EH-WSN.
limited in energy, the SNs must harvest energy from multiple
PTSs Pm, m = 1, . . . ,M , to support data transmission. Here,
we consider the scenario presented in [36], in which S is
far from both B and the Ek ; thus, there are no direct S →
B or S → Ek links. Therefore, S → B transmission can
only be performed with the help of the intermediate relays.
Due to size limitations, all SNs, EAVs, and the BS are each
equipped with a single antenna, and all channels are modeled
as Rayleigh fading channels.
Here, we follow [37]–[39] in that the CSI of the whole
system is known at all nodes. This is rational even for passive
EAVs because the SNs can estimate the CSI by detecting the
local oscillator power that is inadvertently leaked from the
front-end RF receivers of the EAVs [39].
For mathematical modeling purposes, the channel coeffi-
cients of the P→ S, P→ Ln, S → Ln, Ln→ Ek , and Ln→
B communication links are denoted by hPS , hPLn , hSLn , hLnEk ,
and hLnB, respectively. The distances of the P→ S, P→ Ln,
S → Ln, Ln → Ek , and Ln → B communication links are
denoted by dPS , dPLn , dSLn , dLnEk , and dLnB, respectively.
B. ENERGY HARVESTING
We deploy a time switching receiver (TSR) protocol to
harvest energy and process information at S and the Ln [40].
Each SN is assumed to adopt the harvest-use (HU) mode for
EH and information transmission [41]; i.e., the SNs neither
save energy nor recharge their batteries, and all harvested
energy is used immediately. This assumption is rational
because the SNs are equipped only with small batteries for
energy storage due to size limitations.
In Fig. 2, the symbol T represents the time block corre-
sponding to one HU period, such that αT is the EH time of
both the source and relay nodes, while (1−α)T is the time for
information transmission, whereα ∈ (0, 1). The timewindow
for information transmission is divided into two phases as
follows: (1−α)2 T is used for S → Ln communication, and
the remaining time (1−α)2 T is simultaneously used for both
Ln→ B communication and Ln→ Ek jamming.
In this paper, we consider the scenario presented in [42]
and [43], in which only one PTS is selected as active for
FIGURE 2. TSR protocol at a relay. The considered time block T is used for
both EH and information transmission; the time αT is used to harvest
energy from multiple PTSs, while the remaining time (1− α)T is used to
transmit the packet from the source to the BS.
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the purpose of calculating the computational cost and the
energy demand reduction. Here, a particular PTS (with the
best channel for the Pm → S link) is selected to transmit
power to S, similar to the selection of a PTS for each Ln. Note
that it is possible that the same PTS may be selected for both
purposes depending on the channel gain. This selection can
be interpreted as follows:
hPLn
1= max
m=1,...,M
{|hPmLn |}, (1)
and
hPS
1= max
m=1,...,M
{|hPmS |}. (2)
Accordingly, the energy harvested at Ln during the EH time
αT is given by [44]
EPLn =
ηαP0T
∣∣hPLn ∣∣2
dθPLn
= ηαP0TγPLn , (3)
and the energy harvested at S is given by
EPS = ηαP0T |hPS |
2
dθPS
= ηαP0TγPS , (4)
where P0 is the power transmitted from the PTSs; η ∈ (0, 1)
is the EH efficiency coefficient, which depends on the EH
circuitry [44]; θ is the path loss exponent; γPS = |hPS |2dθPS ;
and γPLn = |hPLn |
2
dθPLn
.
Remark 1: We assume that each channel coefficient Xj,
j = 1, . . . , J , is a random variable that follows an expo-
nential distribution. Thus, the probability density function
(PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X =
max
j=1,...,J
{
Xj
}
are calculated as follows:
fX (x) = J
λX
e−
x
λX
(
1− e− xλX
)J−1
(5)
and
FX (x) =
(
1− e−
x
λγX
)J
, (6)
where λX is the mean channel gain.
With the help of Remark 1, we obtain the PDFs of γPS
and γPLn as follows:
fγPS (x) =
M
λPS
e−
x
λPS
(
1− e− xλPS
)M−1
(7)
and
fγPLn (x) =
M
λPLn
e
− x
λPLn
(
1− e−
x
λPLn
)M−1
, (8)
where λPLn =
E
[|hPLn |2]
dθPLn
, λPS = E
[|hPS |2]
dθPS
, and E [·] is an
expectation operator.
C. COMMUNICATION MODEL
Under the assumption that the channel fading coefficients
remain constant during a given time slot but may change
in the next time slot, the transmit power of S is obtained
as [27]
PPS = EPS(1−α)
2 T
= 2ηαP0
(1− α)γPS , (9)
and the transmit power of Ln is obtained as
PPLn =
EPLn
(1−α)
2 T
= 2ηαP0
(1− α)γPLn . (10)
Accordingly, information is communicated in two phases,
as follows:
• In the first phase, S broadcasts packets to all SNs. Thus,
the received signal at Ln is given by
yLn (t) =
√
PPS
dθSLn
hSLnx(t)+ nLn , (11)
where x(t) is the transmitted signal and nLn is a complex
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) component at
Ln, nLn ∈ CN (0,N0).
• In the second phase, the signal received at each SN
Ln is fully decoded [45] and is then re-encoded before
being forwarded to B. During this time, the jammer also
injects additional jamming signals to interfere with the
EAVswith the purpose of degrading their eavesdropping
capability [46]. Thus, the received signals at B and at
each Ek are as follows:
yB(t) =
√
PPR
dθRB
hRBx(t)+ nB (12)
and
yEk (t)=
√
PPR
dθREk
hREk x(t)+
√
PPJ
dθJEk
hJEk z(t)+nEk , (13)
where nB and nEk are the complex AWGN components
at B and the Ek , respectively, nB ∈ CN (0,N0) and nEk ∈
CN (0,N0).
The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at each Ln
and B and the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at each Ek can be written as follows:
γSLn =
∣∣hSLn ∣∣2
dθSLn
, (14)
γLnB =
∣∣hLnB∣∣2
dθLnB
, (15)
γLnEk =
∣∣hLnEk ∣∣2
dθLnEk
. (16)
Thus, the end-to-end SNR at B and the SINR at each Ek for
each Ln are given as follows [47], [48]:
γ
(n)
B = min
{
γSLn , γLnB
}
(17)
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and
γ
(n)
Ek = min
{
γSLn , γLnEk
}
. (18)
Here, we consider the case presented in [27] and [36]
in which the SNR at Ln is better than both the SNR at B and
the SINR at Ek , i.e., γSLn > γLnB and γSLn > γLnEk . Note that
further evaluations regarding the assumption of distance vs.
channel gain are left for future investigations, as stated in the
future work section. Therefore, the end-to-end SNR at B and
the end-to-end SINR at Ek for Ln can be rewritten as
γ
(n)
B = γLnB (19)
and
γ
(n)
Ek = γLnEk . (20)
Next, we focus on the secrecy performance of two
schemes, namely, the best-relay-and-random-jammer scheme
(BRS) and the random-relay-and-best-jammer (RBS) [27];
then, we propose a new strategy, the best-relay-and-best-
jammer (BBS), and compare this strategy with the two
previous ones in terms of the SOP metric.
1) DESCRIPTION OF THE BRS
Here, we investigate the BRS, in which jammer J is randomly
selected from among (N + 1) intermediate relays to combat
the EAVs and the best relay R∗ is chosen from among the
remaining N SNs serving as intermediate relays to forward
packets to B, i.e.,
hR∗B
1= max
n=1,...,N
{|hLnB|}. (21)
The CDFs of γR∗B and γJEk are obtained with the help of
Remark 1 as follows:
FγR∗B (x) =
(
1− e−
x
λγR∗B
)N
(22)
and
FγJEk (x) = 1− e
− x
λγJEk , (23)
where γR∗B = |hR∗B|
2
dθR∗B
, γJEk =
∣∣hJEk ∣∣2
dθJEk
, λR∗B =
E
[|hR∗B|2]
dθR∗B
,
and λJEk =
E
[∣∣hJEk ∣∣2]
dθJEk
.
R∗ forwards the encoded packet to B, while J transmits
jamming signals to B and the Ek . Here, for synchronization
purposes, the same set of Gaussian pseudorandom jamming
signals is generated on both the BS and the jammer, allowing
B to cooperate with J . Afterward, when the jammer transmits
an interference signal to the BS, unlike the unknown EAVs,
the BS can remove this signal by exploiting this prior infor-
mation, while the EAVs will still receive interference from
the jammer [49], [50].
Here, the EAVs are assumed to have perfect knowledge of
the protocol for legitimate transmissions from the relay to B,
including the coding, modulation scheme, and encryption
algorithm; however, the encoded signal is confidential [51].
Consequently, with the help of (19) and (20), the instanta-
neous end-to-end SNR at B in the BRS is given by
γ
(BRS)
B =
PPR∗ |hR∗B|2
N0dθR∗B
= ςγPR∗γR∗B, (24)
and the end-to-end SINR at each Ek in the BRS can be
calculated as follows:
γ
(BRS)
Ek =
PPR∗
∣∣hR∗Ek ∣∣2
dθR∗Ek
(
PPJ
dθJEk
∣∣hJEk ∣∣2 + N0)
= ςγPR∗γR∗Ek
ςγPJγJEk + 1
, (25)
where ς = 2ηαP0N0(1−α) , γPR∗ =
|hPR∗ |2
dθPR∗
, and γR∗Ek =
∣∣∣hR∗Ek ∣∣∣2
dθR∗Ek
.
2) DESCRIPTION OF THE RBS
In this strategy, R is randomly selected from among (N + 1)
SNs serving as intermediate relays to forward the encoded
packet to B and the best J∗ is then chosen from the remaining
N SNs to combat the EAVs, i.e.,
hJ∗Ek
1= max
n=1,...,N
{|hLnEk |}. (26)
Similar to the approach represented in (22), the CDFs
of γRB and γJ∗Ek are obtained as follows:
FγRB (x) = 1− e−
x
λγRB (27)
and
FγJ∗Ek (x) =
(
1− e−
x
λγJ∗Ek
)N
, (28)
where γRB = |hRB|2dθRB , γJ∗Ek =
∣∣∣hJ∗Ek ∣∣∣2
dθJ∗Ek
, λRB = E
[|hRB|2]
dθRB
,
and λJ∗Ek =
E
[∣∣∣hJ∗Ek ∣∣∣2
]
dθJ∗Ek
.
Furthermore, similar to (19) and (20), the instantaneous
end-to-end SNR at B and the SINR at Ek in the RBS are
given by
γ
(RBS)
B =
PPR|hRB|2
N0dθRB
= ςγPRγRB (29)
and
γ
(RBS)
Ek =
PPR
∣∣hREk ∣∣2
dθREk
[
PPJ∗
dθJ∗Ek
∣∣hJ∗Ek ∣∣2 + N0]
= ςγPRγREk
ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek + 1
, (30)
where γPR = |hPR|2dθPR and γREk =
∣∣hREk ∣∣2
dθREk
.
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3) DESCRIPTION OF THE BBS
In this strategy, we propose to select the best SN as R∗ from
among (N +1) SNs serving as intermediate relays to forward
the encoded packet to B, i.e.,
hR∗B
1= max
n=1,...,N+1
{|hLnB|}, (31)
and to choose the second-best SN from among the remaining
N SNs to serve as J∗ with the purpose of jamming the EAVs,
i.e.,
hJ∗Ek
1= max
n˜=1,...,N
{|hLn˜Ek |}. (32)
The CDFs of γR∗B and γJ∗Ek are obtained with the help of
Remark 1 as follows:
FγR∗B (x) =
(
1− e−
x
λγR∗B
)N+1
(33)
and
FγJ∗Ek (x) =
(
1− e−
x
λγJ∗Ek
)N
. (34)
Similar to (24) and (25), the instantaneous end-to-end SNR
at B and the SINR at Ek in the BBS are given by
γ
(BBS)
B =
PPR∗ |hR∗B|2
N0dθR∗B
= ςγPR∗γR∗B (35)
and
γ
(BBS)
Ek =
PPR∗
∣∣hR∗Ek ∣∣2
dθR∗Ek
[
PPJ∗
dθJ∗Ek
∣∣hJ∗Ek ∣∣2 + N0]
= ςγPR∗γR∗Ek
ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek + 1
. (36)
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the channel capacities and SOPs of the BRS,
RBS, and BBS are analyzed.
A. CHANNEL CAPACITY
Using the Shannon capacity formula [52], the instantaneous
channel capacity of the S → B link without jamming is
given by
CB = W log2(1+ γB), (37)
where W is the system bandwidth, γB ∈ {γ (BRS)B , γ (RBS)B ,
γ
(BBS)
B }, and CB ∈ {C (BRS)B ,C (RBS)B ,C (BBS)B }.
Similarly, we can obtain the instantaneous channel
capacity of each S → Ek link when affected by jamming
signals as follows:
CEk = W log2(1+ γEk ), (38)
where γEk ∈ {γ (BRS)Ek , γ
(RBS)
Ek , γ
(BBS)
Ek } and CEk ∈ {C
(BRS)
Ek ,
C (RBS)Ek ,C
(BBS)
Ek }.
As discussed in [42], [43], [53], and [54], the instanta-
neous secrecy capacity of a channel is a non-negative metric.
Without loss of generality, the bandwidth is normalized to
unity, i.e., W = 1; hence, the instantaneous secrecy capacity
of wireless transmission from S toB in the presence of passive
EAVs Ek is formulated as follows:
CSk =
[
CB − CEk
]+
=
log2
(
1+ γB
1+ γEk
)
, γB > γEk
0, γB ≤ γEk ,
(39)
where CSk ∈ {C (BRS)Sk ,C
(RBS)
Sk ,C
(BBS)
Sk }.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Based on [54], [55], and [56], the SOP is defined as the
probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is below
a predefined threshold value Rth.
The relay-based RF EH-WSN is considered to be suffering
an outage if either the S → R link or the R→ B link suffers
an outage event. Consequently, the SOP of the considered
system for each Ek is given by
SOPk = Pr
{
1− α
2
CSk < Rth
}
= Pr
{
1− α
2
log2
(
γB + 1
γEk + 1
)
< Rth
}
= Pr
{
γB < 2
2Rth
1−α γEk + 2
2Rth
1−α − 1
}
= Pr {γB < ξγEk + ξ − 1}, (40)
where SOPk ∈ {SOP(BRS)k , SOP(RBS)k , SOP(BBS)k } and ξ =
2
2Rth
1−α .
1) DERIVATION FOR THE BRS
By substituting (24) and (25) into (40), the SOP of the relay-
based RF EH-WSN for the k-th EAV under the BRS can be
expressed as
SOP(BRS)k = Pr
{
γ
(BRS)
B < ξγ
(BRS)
Ek + ξ − 1
}
= Pr
{
γR∗B ≤ ξγR∗Ek
ςγPJγJEk + 1
+ ξ − 1
ςγPR∗
}
. (41)
By using [55, Formula (23)], the expression given in (41)
can be rewritten as
SOP(BRS)k =
∞∫
0
Pr
{
γR∗B ≤ ξγR∗Ek
ςγPJγJEk + 1
+ ξ − 1
ςx
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
91
× fγPR∗ (x) dx. (42)
The probability in (42) can be further rewritten by setting
U = ςγPJγJEk + 1, as follows:
91 =
∞∫
1
∞∫
0
FγR∗B
(
ξ t
u
+ ξ − 1
ςx
)
fγR∗Ek (t) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
92
fU (u) du, (43)
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where fU (u) is the PDF of U . Substituting (22) into the func-
tion92 expressed in (43) and using [57, Formula (3.310.11)]
yields
92 =
∞∫
0
[
1− e− 1λR∗B
(
ξ t
u + ξ−1ςx
)]N 1
λR∗Ek
e
− t
λR∗Ek dt
= 1−
∑
n˜
e
− n˜(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx u
u+ n˜ξ λR∗Ek
λR∗B
, (44)
where
∑˜
n
=
N∑˜
n=1
(−1)n˜−1N !
n˜!(N−n˜)! .
By substituting the function 92 and the PDF of U
(see (65) in appendix A) into (33) and using formula (73)
in appendix C, the function 91 can be calculated as follows:
91 =
∞∫
1
1−∑
n˜
e
− n˜(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx u
u+ n˜ξ λR∗Ek
λR∗B
∑
m˜
2 (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJλJEk
×K0
(
2
√
(m˜+ 1) (u− 1)
ςλPJλJEk
)
du
=
∑
m˜
{
1−
∑
n˜
e
− n˜(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx
[
1− ω1λ1S−1,0 (φ1)
]}
, (45)
where
∑
m˜
=
M−1∑
m˜=0
(−1)m˜M !
(m˜+ 1)! (M − m˜− 1)! ,
ω1 = 4n˜ (m˜+ 1) ξ,
φ1 = 2
√√√√ (m˜+ 1) (1+ n˜ξ λR∗EkλR∗B )
ςλPJλJEk
,
λ1 = λR∗Ek
ςλPJλJEkλR∗B
,
and S−1,0(·) is the Lommel function [58].
By substituting (8) into (42) and solving this integral with
the help of [57, Formula (3.324.1)], we obtain the following
expression for SOP(BRS)k :
SOP(BRS)k
=
∞∫
0
∑
m˜
 1−
∑˜
n
e
− n˜(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx
× [1− ω1λ1S−1,0 (φ1)]

× M
λPR∗
e
− x
λPR∗
(
1− e− xλPR∗
)M−1
dx
=
∑
m˜
∑
m
{
1−
∑
n˜
ϕ1K1 (ϕ1)
[
1− ω1λ1S−1,0 (φ1)
]}
, (46)
where
∑
m
=
M−1∑
m=0
(−1)mM !
(m+ 1)! (M − m− 1)! ,
ϕ1 = 2
√
n˜ (ξ − 1) (1+ m)
ςλPR∗λR∗B
,
and the Kn(·) are the Bessel functions (n = 0, 1, . . .).
In a relay-based RF EH-WSN with multiple EAVs, R can
transmit confidential signals to B only if the instantaneous
SNR at B is larger than all SINRs at the EAVs, i.e.,
γE
1= max
k=1,...,K{γEk }. (47)
Accordingly, the SOP under the BRS is calculated as follows:
SOP(BRS) = Pr
{
min
1≤k≤K
{
C (BRS)Sk
}
< Rth
}
= 1− Pr
{
min
1≤k≤K
{
C (BRS)Sk
}
≥ Rth
}
= 1−
K∏
k=1
[
1− Pr
{
C (BRS)Sk < Rth
}]
. (48)
Finally, by substituting (46) into (48), we obtain the
following expression for the SOP of the system under the
BRS:
SOP(BRS)
= 1−
K∏
k=1
[
1− SOP(BRS)k
]
= 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1−
∑
m˜
∑
m
[
1− ∑˜
n
ϕ1K1 (ϕ1)
× [1− ω1λ1S−1,0 (φ1)]
]}
.
(49)
2) DERIVATION FOR THE RBS
By substituting (29) and (30) into (40), the SOP of the relay-
based RF EH-WSN for EAV Ek under the RBS can be
expressed as
SOP(RBS)k = Pr
{
γ
(RBS)
B < ξγ
(RBS)
Ek + ξ − 1
}
=
∞∫
0
Pr
{
γRB ≤ ξγREk
ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek + 1
+ ξ − 1
ςx
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
01
× fγPR (x) dx. (50)
The probability in (50) can be rewritten by setting V =
ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek + 1, as follows:
01 =
∞∫
1
∞∫
0
FγRB
(
ξ t
v
+ ξ − 1
ςx
)
fγREk (t) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
02
fV (v) dv, (51)
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where fV (v) is the PDF of V . By substituting (27) into the
function 02 expressed in (51) and using formula (3.310.11)
in [57], we obtain
02 =
∞∫
0
[
1− e− 1λRB
(
ξ t
v + ξ−1ςx
)]
1
λREk
e
− t
λREk dt
= 1− e
− ξ−1
ςλRBx v
v+ ξλREk
λRB
. (52)
Now, by substituting 02 and the PDF of V (see (69)
in appendix B) into (51) and using (73) in appendix C,
the integral function 01 can be expressed as
01 =
∞∫
1
1− e− ξ−1ςλRBx v
v+ ξλREk
λRB
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
2n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
×K0
(
2
√
(v− 1) n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗E
)
du
=
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
{
1− e− ξ−1ςλRBx [1− ω1λ2S−1,0 (φ2)]}, (53)
where
φ2 = 2
√√√√ n˜ (m˜+ 1) (1+ ξλREkλRB )
ςλPJ∗λJ∗E
and λ2 = λREk
ςλPJ∗λJ∗EkλRB
.
By substituting (8) and (53) into (50) and solving this inte-
gral using [57, Formula (3.324.1)], we can calculate SOP(RBS)k
as follows:
SOP(RBS)k
=
∞∫
0
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
{
1− e− ξ−1ςλRBx
× [1− ω1λ2S−1,0 (φ2)]
}
× M
λPR
e−
x
λPR
(
1− e− xλPR
)M−1
dx
=
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
∑
m
{
1−ϕ2K1 (ϕ2)
[
1−ω1λ2S−1,0 (φ2)
]}
, (54)
where ϕ2 = 2
√
(ξ−1)(m+1)
ςλPRλRB
.
In the considered RF EH-WSN with multiple EAVs,
SOP(RBS)k can be formulated as
SOP(RBS)
= Pr
{
min
1≤k≤K
{
C (RBS)Sk
}
< Rth
}
= 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1−
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
∑
m
[
1− ϕ2K1 (ϕ2)
× [1− ω1λ2S−1,0 (φ2)]
]}
.
(55)
3) DERIVATION FOR THE BBS
By substituting (35) and (36) into (40), the SOP of the relay-
based RF EH-WSN for EAV Ek under the BBS can be
expressed as
SOP(BBS)k = Pr
{
γ
(BBS)
B < ξγ
(BBS)
Ek + ξ − 1
}
=
∞∫
0
Pr
{
γR∗B ≤ ξγR∗Ek
ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek + 1
+ ξ − 1
ςx
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
81
× fγPR∗ (x) dx. (56)
The probability in (56) can be calculated as follows:
81 =
∞∫
1
∞∫
0
FγR∗B
(
ξ t
v
+ ξ − 1
ςx
)
fγR∗Ek (t) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
82
fV (v) dv. (57)
By substituting (33) into the function82 expressed in (57)
and using [57, Formula (3.310.11)], we obtain the following:
82 =
∞∫
0
[
1− e− 1λR∗B
(
ξ t
v + ξ−1ςx
)]N+1 1
λR∗Ek
e
− t
λR∗Ek dt
= 1−
∑
n
e
− n(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx v
v+ nξ λR∗Ek
λR∗B
, (58)
where
∑
n
=
N+1∑
n=1
(−1)n−1(N+1)!
n!(N+1−n)! .
Then, by substituting the function 82 and the PDF
of V (see (69) in appendix B) into (56) and using (73)
in appendix C, we can obtain the function 81 as follows:
81 =
∞∫
1
1−∑
n
e
− n(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx v
v+ nξ λR∗Ek
λR∗B
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
2n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
×K0
(
2
√
(v− 1) n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
)
dv
=
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
{
1−
∑
n
e
− n(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx
[
1− ω3λ3S−1,0 (φ3)
]}
,
(59)
where
φ3 = 2
√√√√ n˜ (m˜+ 1) (1+ nξ λR∗EkλR∗B )
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
,
λ3 = λR∗Ek
ςλPJ∗λJ∗EkλR∗B
,
and ω3 = 4 nn˜ (m˜+ 1) ξ.
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By substituting (8) and (56) into (50) and solving this inte-
gral using [57, Formula (3.324.1)], we can calculate SOP(BBS)k
as follows:
SOP(BBS)k
=
∞∫
0
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
 1−
∑
n
e
− n(ξ−1)
ςλR∗Bx
× [1− ω3λ3S−1,0 (φ3)]

× M
λPR∗
e
− x
λPR∗
(
1− e− xλPR∗
)M−1
=
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
∑
m
{
1−
∑
n
ϕ3K1 (ϕ3)
[
1−ω3λ3S−1,0 (φ3)
]}
,
(60)
where ϕ3 = 2
√
n(m+1)(ξ−1)
ςλPR∗λR∗B .
For the considered RF EH-WSN with multiple EAVs,
SOP(BBS) can be expressed as follows:
SOP(BBS)
= Pr
{
min
1≤k≤K
{
C (BBS)Sk
}
< Rth
}
= 1−
K∏
k=1
{
1−
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
∑
m
[
1−∑
n
ϕ3K1 (ϕ3)
× [1−ω3λ3S−1,0 (φ3)]
]}
.
(61)
Accordingly, the proposed algorithm finds a near-optimal
EH time by splitting the possible values of the EH time
proportion (α) into an array (from 0.0 to 1.0) and substi-
tuting each value in the array until the lowest SOP (SOP∗)
is found, thus yielding the optimal α (α∗). The near-optimal
algorithm for selecting the EH time for the BBS is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results of a Monte
Carlo simulation to verify the closed-form expression for
the secrecy performance of the proposed communication
technique. Specifically, we evaluate the secrecy performance
of the considered system by considering the effects on the
SOP of the distance from R to B, dRB; the EH time, α; the
EH efficiency coefficient, η; the SNR, P0/N0; the number
of PTSs, M ; the number of EAVs, K ; and the number of
relays, N . Unless otherwise stated, the system parameters
for both the analysis and the simulation are as follows [27]:
dPS = dPLn = 2.5, dRB ∈ (0.4, 1.2), dREk ∈ {2, 3, 4},
dJEk ∈ {4, 3, 2}, Rth = 1 kbps, θ = 3, α ∈ (0.0, 1.0), η ∈
(0.0, 1.0), SNR ∈ (−5.0, 15.0), K ∈ {1, 2, 3}, M ∈ {2, 4, 6},
and N ∈ [1, 10]. We evaluate the following three schemes:
• Best-relay-and-random-jammer scheme (BRS): J is
randomly chosen from among (N + 1) SNs, and R∗ is
the best SN chosen from among the remaining N SNs.
• Random-relay-and-best-jammer scheme (RBS): R is
randomly chosen from among (N + 1) SNs, and J∗ is
the best SN chosen from among the remaining N SNs.
Algorithm 1 Near-Optimal Energy Harvesting Time
1: procedure NOEHT
2: Initialize SOP∗ = 1, i = 1, and α(i) ∈ (0, 1);
3: while α(i) < 1 do
4: ξ = 2 2Rth1−α(i) ;
5: ς = 2ηα(i)P01−α(i) ;
6: λ3 = λR∗EkςλPJλJ∗Ek λR∗B ;
7: ω3 = 4nn˜ (m˜+ 1) ξλ3;
8: ϕ3 = 2
√
n(m+1)(ξ−1)
ςλPR∗λR∗B ;
9:
∑
m
=
M−1∑
m=0
(−1)mM !
(m+1)!(M−m−1)! ;
10:
∑˜
m
=
M−1∑˜
m=0
(−1)m˜M !
(m˜+1)!(M−m˜−1)! ;
11:
∑
n
=
N+1∑
n=1
(−1)n−1(N+1)!
n!(N+1−n)! ;
12:
∑˜
n
=
N∑˜
n=1
(−1)n˜−1N !
n!(N−n˜)! ;
13: Calculate SOP(BBS)(i) according to (61);
14: if SOP∗ < SOP(BBS)(i) then
15: SOP∗ = SOP(BBS)(i− 1);
16: α∗ = α(i− 1);
17: break;
18: else
19: SOP∗ = SOP(BBS)(i);
20: i = i+ 1;
21: end if
22: end while
23: return α∗ and SOP∗;
24: end procedure
• Best-relay-and-best-jammer scheme (BBS): R∗ is the
best SN chosen from among (N + 1) SNs, and J∗ is
the second-best SN chosen from among the remaining
N SNs.
In the first simulation, we study how the SOP changes with
the SNR, and three conditions with various numbers of EAVs
(K = 1, 2, and 3) are considered for the three schemes. Fig. 3
shows the simulation results. The RBS is worse than the BRS
from the perspective of the secrecy performance because the
effect of the relay on the SOP is higher than that of the jammer
(this is proven by (25) and (30)).
We also observe that the proposed solution (BBS) outper-
forms both the BRS and the RBS because the best J∗ is
selected from among the N SNs serving as intermediate
relays such that the SNRs at the EAVs under the BBS are
higher than those under the other two schemes, consistent
with (25), (30), and (36). This figure also demonstrates
that as the number of EAVs decreases, the SOP of the
proposed scheme also decreases; i.e., the secrecy perfor-
mance is enhanced with decreasing K .
In the second simulation, we investigate how the SOP
changes with the distance between R and B, dRB, and we
23414 VOLUME 6, 2018
V. N. Vo et al.: Secrecy Outage Performance Analysis for EH Sensor Networks With a Jammer
FIGURE 3. Effects on the SOP of various SNRs and various numbers of
EAVs (K ) with α = 0.41, η = 0.85, N = 10, SNR = 10 dB, and M = 4.
FIGURE 4. Effects on the SOP of various distances between R and B (dRB)
and various numbers of PTSs (M) with α = 0.41, η = 0.85, SNR = 10 dB,
N = 10, and K = 2.
evaluate three conditions with different numbers of PTSs
(M = 2, 4, and 6). The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 4.
We can see that for each value of M , the SOP increases and
approaches 1 as dRB increases. In other words, the secrecy
performance is improved with lower values of dRB. This
result may be attributed to the fact that as dRB increases,
the number of packets received by B rapidly decreases,
consistent with (24), (29), and (35). Furthermore, with an
increasing number of PTSs, a marked difference in the SOP
arises between the BBS and the RBS and also between the
BBS and the BRS.
In the third simulation, we study the effects on the SOP of
various EH efficiency coefficients, η, and numbers of PTSs,
M . The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5. For each value
ofM , the SOP decreases with higher values of η. This occurs
FIGURE 5. Effects on the SOP of various EH efficiency coefficients (η) and
various numbers of PTSs (M) with α = 0.41, SNR = 10 dB, K = 2,
and N = 10.
FIGURE 6. Effects on the SOP of various numbers of SNs (N), various
numbers of EAVs (K ), and various numbers of PTSs (M) with α = 0.41,
η = 0.85, and SNR = 10 dB.
because a higher EH efficiency coefficient means that more
energy can be obtained (based on (10)).
We also investigate the effects on the SOP of various
numbers of SNs, PTSs, and EAVs (N , M , and K , respec-
tively). The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6. The SOP
is improved asM and N increase, either separately or simul-
taneously, and as K decreases.
In the fifth simulation, we study the change in the SOP
with the EH time α, as shown in Figs. 7 and 8. In Fig. 7,
the SOP initially decreases at small values of α, peaks
at a certain point, and then increases to a value near 1.
This behavior occurs because when α is small, the relay
harvests little power, causing the transmission power avail-
able at the relay to be insufficient and resulting in a higher
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FIGURE 7. Effects on the SOP of various EH times (α) and various numbers
of PTSs (M) with η = 0.85, N = 10, SNR = 8 dB, N = 10, and K = 2.
FIGURE 8. Effects on the SOP of various numbers of SNs (N) and various
EH times (α) with η = 0.85, M = 4, SNR = 8 dB, and K = 2.
SOP. However, when α is too large, the secrecy capacity
will be insufficient (according to (40)), and much of the
power harvested for information transmission will be wasted.
Consequently, the secrecy performance is highest for an inter-
mediate value of α.
In addition, this figure shows that the SOP approaches 1
when α → 0+ or α → 1−. This result means that
the secrecy performance of the system is not benefited
by an excessively small or large α. This behavior occurs
because ξ → 22Rth and ς → 0 when α → 0.
From (24), (25), (29), (30), (35), and (36), the instantaneous
SNRs at B and Ek are approximately 0; thus, the SOP of
the considered system approaches 1 (based on (49), (55),
and (61)).
In the final simulation, as shown in Fig. 8, we investigate
the effects of various numbers of SNs and EH times α on the
SOP. We can see that the SOP is lower with α∗ = 0.41 than
it is with either α = 0.21 or α = 0.61; i.e., the considered RF
EH-WSN is most secure when α∗ = 0.41 (the near-optimal
EH time found by the proposed algorithm).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a best-relay-and-best-jammer
scheme (BBS) as well as a near-optimal EH time algorithm
to enhance the secrecy performance of a relay-based RF
EH-WSN. We also derived an exact closed-form expres-
sion for the SOP of the considered system. Our numerical
results show that in our proposed scheme, communica-
tion security can be improved by increasing the number
of SNs and PTSs or by decreasing the number of EAVs,
and that the BBS generally outperforms the best-relay-
and-random-jammer (BRS) and the random-relay-and-best-
jammer (RBS). The analytical results were verified by
Monte Carlo simulations. Note, however, that because of the
model simplifications adopted for the derivations and for the
purpose of computational and energy cost reduction, there
are some limitations that will require further investigation,
i.e., the relationship between the distance and the channel
gain and the case of only one active PTS. In addition, we are
currently investigating a system with multiple relay clusters
and a mobile charger to demonstrate a practical implementa-
tion of an RF EH-WSN.
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THE PDF OF U = 1+ ςγPJγJEk
In accordance with the definition of conditional probability,
the CDF of U can be written as
FU (u) = Pr
{
1+ ςγPJγJEk < u
}
=
∞∫
0
FγJEk
(
u− 1
ςx
)
fγPJ (x) dx, (62)
where u ≥ 1.
By substituting (8) and (23) into (62), we obtain
FU (u) =
∞∫
0
(
1− e−
u−1
ςλJEk
x
)
M
λPJ
e−
x
λPJ
×
(
1− e− xλPJ
)M−1
dx. (63)
After some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the
CDF and PDF of U as follows:
FU (u) =
∑
m˜
 1− 2
√
(m˜+1)(u−1)
ςλPJλJEk
×K1
[
2
√
(m˜+1)(u−1)
ςλPJλJEk
] (64)
and
fU (u) =
∑
m˜
2 (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJλJEk
K0
(
2
√
(m˜+ 1) (u− 1)
ςλPJλJEk
)
. (65)
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B. PROOF OF THE PDF OF V = 1+ ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek
As in Appendix A, the CDF of V can be formulated as
FV (v) = Pr
{
1+ ςγPJ∗γJ∗Ek < v
}
=
∞∫
0
FγJ∗Ek
(
v− 1
ςx
)
fγPJ∗ (x) dx, (66)
where v ≥ 1.
By substituting (8) and (28) into (66), we obtain
FV (v) =
(
1− e−
v−1
ςλJ∗Ek x
)N M
λPJ∗
e
− x
λPJ∗
×
(
1− e−
x
λPJ∗
)M−1
dx. (67)
After some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the
CDF and PDF of V as follows:
FV (v) =
∑
m˜

1− ∑˜
n
2
√
n˜(m˜+1)(v−1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
×K1
[
2
√
n˜(m˜+1)(v−1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
]
 (68)
and
fV (v) =
∑
m˜
∑
n˜
2n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
K0
(
2
√
(v− 1) n˜ (m˜+ 1)
ςλPJ∗λJ∗Ek
)
.
(69)
C. PROOF OF THE FORMULA USED IN (45), (53), AND (59)
We reproduce the two functions (6.561.16) and (6.565.7)
presented in [57] as follows:
∞∫
0
xK0 (bx)dx = b−2 (70)
and
∞∫
0
x
x2 + a2K0 (bx)dx = S−1,0 (ab) , (71)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants.
From these formulas, we have
∞∫
0
[
K0 (bx)
(
x + x
x2 + a2
)]
dx = b−2 + S−1,0 (ab). (72)
After some mathematical manipulations, we derive (72) as
follows:
∞∫
0
[
K0 (bx)
(
x3 + x
x2 + a2
)]
dx
= b−2 + S−1,0 (ab)
− a2
∞∫
0
x
x2 + a2K0 (bx)dx
= b−2 + S−1,0 (ab)
(
1− a2
)
. (73)
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